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Abstract. In order to be successfully integrated in our society, artificial moral
agents need to know not only how to act in a moral scenario, but also how to iden-
tify the scenario first as being morally-relevant. This work looks at certain com-
plex video games as simulations of artificial societies and studies the way in which
morally-qualifiable actions are identified and assessed in them. Then, this analy-
sis is used to distill a general formal model for moral actions aimed to be used as
a first step towards identifying morally-qualifiable actions in the field of artificial
morality. After discussing which elements are represented in this model, and how
they are enhanced with respect to those already existing in the analyzed games, this
work points out to some caveats that those games fail to address, and which would
need to be tackled properly by artificial moral systems.
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1. Introduction and Motivations
Artificial morality is a field that aims to furnish artificial systems with moral reasoning
capabilities. In the literature, those systems are known as Artificial Moral Agents (or
AMAs, for short). The reasons why the field of artificial morality is gathering more
attention among researchers is directly related to the fact that artificial agents become
more and more autonomous, and so more capable of affecting the world with their own
decisions, as argued in [15]; autonomous vehicles, military robots and artificial assistants
for elderly care are some examples of such systems. Although, as argued in [10], the
necessary and sufficient conditions that characterize a genuine moral agent are still under
debate by philosophers and ethicists, the important thing to note is that, as [1] points out,
artificial agents already act in ways that can have moral consequences. Therefore, what
is important in this matter is recognizing that autonomous agents that can potentially
cause moral good or bad with their actions need to be provided with some system that
allows them to assess what the appropriate course of action is. Different approaches and
challenges have also been discussed in works such as [9], [20], [23], or [16].
Even though they are seldom looked at as such, certain video games embed complex
simulations of artificial societies in their virtual worlds. As it has been argued in [8],
studying such cases under the lens of multi-agent systems and artificial worlds can pro-
vide interesting insights with regards to agent models and simulations; particularly, cer-
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tain games provide detailed representations for the assessment of the moral dimension of
in-game actions, which can be studied in conjunction with insights taken from the field
of artificial morality. The intersection between morality and video games has received a
lot of attention in the literature, although under quite different perspectives: some works
such as [19] focus on how to design ethical video games; other works like [24] focus on
whether video games can have any impact on the development of their players’ moral
values; and some works, like [18], or [22], focus on how video games can keep track and
evaluate the moral consequences of their characters’ actions. Our interest in the present
work lies within the last approach —namely, in comparing how certain video games’
morality systems, which are the mechanisms responsible for identifying and assessing
the moral weight of events happening within the virtual world, can be related to insights
and challenges that are also present in the field of artificial morality.
This work builds bridges between the fields of artificial morality and the study of
complex computer role-playing games, or CRPGs, as artificial societies. The main con-
tribution is to identify and provide a general formal model to represent how morally-
qualifiable actions can be identified from an external point of view, inspired by cases
taken from different CRPGs. In Section 2, it is argued how, in order to be fully integrated
in our society, AMAs would need not only to assess and act accordingly in moral sce-
narios, but also to be able to identify them beforehand. A study of certain complex video
games in Section 3 provides an analysis of how moral actions are identified by the moral-
ity systems implemented in those games, which points out to the set of elements that
determine when an action has a moral dimension. In Section 4, the insights gained from
the previous analyses are distilled into the proposed formal model of morally-qualifiable
actions, and some caveats already shown in the formerly reviewed games are discussed.
Last, Section 5 presents some conclusions and lines of future work.
2. AMAs Before Moral Action
If artificial morality is to be effectively integrated at a large scale in AI systems, those
would need to be equipped not only with the capacity of acting in a morally-desirable
way when faced with a clearly-identified moral scenario, but also to be able to identify
morally-relevant scenarios by themselves, as well as assessing the relevant factors that
evaluate those scenarios as being either good or bad. Current approaches to the design
and implementation of AMAs, such as [2], or [16], rely on having relevant moral situa-
tions already identified and on spoon-feeding them to the systems. Then, the AMAs need
to assess what the moral value of that scenario is, and decide how to react accordingly.
If moral reasoning is to be integrated in the overall cycle of artificial systems, though,
one needs to consider a bigger picture when it comes to recognizing the phases of moral
action. In particular, an AMA needs to:
1. Identify: Prior to bringing moral reasoning into the decision system, an AMA
needs to be able to distinguish between events that have moral relevance, or not.
2. Assess: Once the AMA has identified a certain event as having a moral dimen-
sion, it must be able to assess whether that event can be considered morally good,
or bad, and compute “how much” good or bad it is.
3. React: Once the agent “understands” the moral value of the event it is evaluating,
it can decide how to react accordingly and choose an action aiming towards the
most desirable outcome3.
Current existing approaches to AMAs focus on the last two steps: namely, assessing
moral events and reacting to them. However, in those cases the relevant events are already
given to the AMA as pre-identified morally-qualifiable events. Due to this, this work
draws the attention towards the first step of identifying moral events, which would need
to be integrated in any existing AMA that is meant to incorporate moral behavior not
only as an output for pre-identified events fed into it, but as one of its built-in features
in relation to its environment. In order to understand how morally-qualifiable events can
be identified from the perspective of an external observer, this work looks through a
somewhat unusual lens: the study of CRPGs as simulations of artificial societies.
3. Video Games as Simulations of Artificial Societies
Some CRPGs present the player with a complex virtual world inhabited by virtual agents
(often referred to as non-player characters, or NPCs) which often follow their own sched-
ules, routines, needs and desires across the in-game world, and do so independently from
the actions of the player. Furthermore, some of these CRPGs capture a high degree of
detail with respect to the way those NPCs react to the actions carried out by the player,
depending on whether these actions are deemed to be “good” or “bad” with respect to the
game’s morality system. In order to do so, those games usually feature a comprehensive
system to build and keep track of the player’s moral persona within the game as a reflex
of the player’s behavior towards the inhabitants of the virtual world. As it is argued in
[8], some of these games present an architecture for morality systems in virtual societies
that could lead to promising research lines, if combined with the fields of multi-agent
systems and artificial societies.
Aside from pre-scripted choices that are part of the main plot, most open-world
CRPGs also offer a high degree of freedom of action allowing for the appearance of
“off-script” emergent play, which is a highly sought out property in open-world games.
It is precisely with regards to this kind of actions that the game needs to implement some
sort of morality system to recognize which of those are morally relevant, assess whether
they are considered good or bad by the in-game value system, and reflect that on the
player’s moral persona. When considering how this kind of games identify and assess
morally-qualifiable actions, the game engine can be seen as a sort of “overseer” with
nearly perfect information about the state of the game’s world and its virtual agents; by
studying this kind of games through this lens, this work revolves around the following
questions:
1. How does the game engine identify morally-relevant actions?
2. What are the relevant elements used to assess their moral weight?
3. Can different ethical theories be captured by those morality systems?
4. Is there anything relevant that cannot yet be captured in such setting?
3Works like [12] argue that a decision on a moral action should never be left to the machine alone –that is,
there should always be a human-in-the-loop. This topic, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.
Answering the first and the second questions leads to the definition of a general model
for morally-qualifiable actions; exploring the third question shows how existing morality
systems already allow to capture the particularities of different ethical theories in a com-
putational setting; finally, the fourth question points out to further challenges for the field
of artificial morality, as it is argued how certain features of moral actions cannot yet be
captured, even in a setting with an overseer with almost perfect information. The follow-
ing subsections provide an overview of three games with morality systems that capture
three different ethical theories, and which are used to discuss the previous questions.
3.1. The Elder Scrolls and the Consequentialist Approach
A game could be designed to represent some form of Jeremy Bentham’s account of
utilitarianism [14], which aims to measure the amount of happiness and pain resulting
from an action, and which defends the ethical principle that the “best” action is the one
that maximizes happiness for the maximum amount of people. Even though this approach
is not devoid of complications, it provides the designers with a straightforward way of
expressing moral weight in mathematical terms. As the game engine has access to the
data of everything belonging to the virtual world and its inhabitants, it is relatively easy
to measure how much certain events affect this data, and to interpret those changes as
being good or bad for the world and the artificial characters living in it.
Although games do not usually implement a straightforward calculation of happi-
ness and suffering in their morality systems, some form of consequentialism is, proba-
bly, the easier way to account for the morality of the player’s actions. An example of
a well-known series of games conforming to this is The Elder Scrolls saga, in which a
particularly detailed morality system can be found in the fourth title of the saga, The
Elder Scrolls IV: Oblivion [3]; this system does not only account for the moral persona
of the player, but also make NPCs more or less prone to respect the in-game law system,
depending on their urge to satisfy certain needs (see [7] for more details on this, as well
as a proposal on how to enhance the existing in-game mechanics to furnish non-playable
characters with a certain degree of operational moral autonomy).
What makes an action good or bad, in this kind of games, is usually not the action in
itself; instead, the relevance falls on the “patient” that receives that action. For instance,
killing a character identified by the game as non-evil, such as a peaceful citizen, normally
results in the player character losing “moral points”, whereas killing an evil NPC, such
as a bandit, grants positive moral points. Considering this, it can be seen how, by moving
the point of evaluation of a moral event to the patient, rather than the action itself, games
following this approach fall into a consequentialist approach that aims to evaluate the
balance between the good and bad outcomes of an event, rather than aiming at an act-
centered deontological approach that would classify events depending solely on the act
itself.
3.2. Fallout and the Intentionalist Approach
Other ethical systems, inspired by Kantian ethics, could also be considered. In a nutshell,
those accounts determine what is moral and what is not by looking at the “will”, or
“intention” behind an action. What matters, rather than the actual outcome of a choice,
is whether the intention of the one who carried out the action was good. However, and as
pointed out in [11], it would be very difficult to effectively implement this kind of ethical
system within a game, as the game would need to reach beyond the player character,
and straight into the player’s intentions. However, the games in the Fallout series base
the main measurement of the player’s moral profile on the notion of karma, which aims
to account not for the consequences of the player’s choices, but rather for the intention
behind those choices (see [6]). But how do those games aim to account for that, given
what it has just been said about capturing intentions?
In order to illustrate that, let us consider a case from Fallout 3 [4], which is no
strange in the academic literature: the Tenpenny Tower quest line. Briefly explained, this
quest takes the player to a tower inhabited by a group of humans, and where a band
of ghouls (which are horribly-mutated humans as a result of exposure to radiation) also
want to live in; nevertheless, the tower residents do not want the ghouls to live in there.
The player is given three ways of resolving this quest: 1) to side with the humans and
kill the band of ghouls; 2) to side with the ghouls and help them sneak into the tower
(which would result in them killing the human inhabitants); 3) or to find a diplomatic
solution to the conflict, allowing both humans and ghouls to live together in the tower.
The “good” choice, karma-wise, is to find a diplomatic solution to the conflict. After
doing so, the player can come back to the tower a few days later to find both humans and
ghouls apparently getting along pretty well; nevertheless, coming back after a few more
days shows that the humans and the ghouls had a “disagreement” and the ghoul leader
decided to “take out the trash” —at the tower’s basement, the player will then find the
bodies of all the former human inhabitants.
However, and even though the long-term consequences of the diplomatic solution
to this quest can be considered bad, the game rewards the player with good karma when
following this approach. The reasons behind this is, precisely, because the intention be-
hind the player’s choice was good, the consequences that would likely follow from such
choice were meant to be good, and the resulting slaughter was a long-term, unforeseeable
consequence that goes beyond the player’s actual involvement in the conflict. This depth
of unforeseeable, player-independent consequences on the player’s choices is, precisely,
what makes moral choices in Fallout so unique with respect to other video games. By
reflecting on the way Fallout aims to capture intention in the player’s actions, it can be
seen how this notion, when measured from the point of view of an external system, can
be defined as:
The intention of an action can be externally identified as the consequences that would
most likely follow from that action, according to the state of affairs believed by the
agent at the moment of performing the action.
This definition has strong parallelisms with the well-known Belief - Desire - Intention
(BDI) theory (firstly defined in [5]); although going deeper into this parallelism would
fall outside the scope of the present work, this “vanilla” version of intention that has
just been defined could be used to account for such notion from an external point of
view, thus tackling the other-minds problem, and being a starting point to represent it
in artificial systems4. Regardless of this particular example to show how Fallout 3 aims
to capture the player’s intentions, the game follows the same reasoning regarding other
4It is only fair to note that, by tapping unto the agent’s beliefs in order to account for intentions, the other-
minds problem is, in the end, only moved from one place to another.
actions, meaning that the moral alignment of the patient mainly determines whether the
action is deemed to be good or bad by its morality system.
3.3. Ultima and Virtue Ethics
Conversely, a game could adopt virtue ethics, founded by Plato and Aristotle and de-
fended by contemporary authors such as [13], as its underlying ethical system. Probably
the most well-known saga that takes virtue ethics as their underlying ethical system is
the Ultima saga, with a special emphasis on Ultima IV [17]. In contrast with utilitar-
ianism, or intentionalism, virtue ethics is based on the development and cultivation of
habits and behaviors in accordance to a certain set of virtues; given the medieval fantastic
setting of the game, which is inspired by medieval chivalry codes, those virtues include
compassion, justice, or valor, to name a few. In this case, a morality system capturing
virtue ethics as the underlying ethical system should focus on which particular virtue an
action would account for, instead of just measuring the consequences of such action, or
the intention behind it.
In Ultima IV, virtues are mapped into in-game actions by identifying how those ac-
tions align to one or another virtue, depending on a set of factors. For the sake of simplic-
ity, the following example focuses only on how two different virtues5, compassion and
valor, work with respect to a single action, fighting. Furthermore, the example focuses on
two possible outcomes in a fight: to flee from it, or to kill the enemy. What is interesting
in this case is that the player fleeing from the fight, letting the enemy flee, or killing the
enemy have quite different effects on the virtues of compassion and valor, depending ex-
clusively on one feature: the enemy’s moral alignment. NPCs are tagged within the game
as being either evil, or non-evil. Now, if the player is engaged in a fight with an evil NPC,
killing it will increase the virtue of valor for the player, whereas fleeing will decrease the
player’s valor. Conversely, if the player is engaged in a fight with a non-evil NPC, such
as a peaceful citizen, or even a wild animal such as a deer, just the act of engaging in a
fight with it will result in a severe penalty to the virtue of compassion, whereas fleeing
from the fight, or allowing the NPC to flee, will result in a compassion benefit. Table 1
summarizes this brief example.
Evil NPC Non-evil NPC
Fight ↑ Valor ↓ Compassion
Flee ↓ Valor ↑ Compassion
Allow to flee - ↑ Compassion
Table 1. Actions, patients and virtues in Ultima IV.
Just as it happened with the previous games, the only thing that determines the vir-
tuous outcomes of how the fight resolves has to do with the patient that “receives” those
actions and, in particular, with the patient’s alignment. In this case, though, instead of
just polarizing the actions towards one side of a good / evil axis, Ultima IV goes one
step beyond and defines a complex net of relations between agent, action, patient and
virtues, thus showing how existing morality systems in video games can also capture
virtue ethics defined in a pretty detailed way by means of a top-down system.
5Virtues in Ultima IV is quite complex, but only those two virtues are considered here for simplicity. For
more information, see https://strategywiki.org/wiki/Ultima IV: Quest of the Avatar/The Shrines of Virtue .
4. Towards a General Model for Actions
As is has just been shown, several CRPGs featuring an open-world with a certain freedom
of action need to include a way of identifying whether those actions are considered good,
or bad, within the game. This is done both to account for short-term reactions, such as
how the NPCs affected by those actions behave, as well as to account for a longer-term
characterization of the player’s moral persona. Even though different games account for
different nuances, it can be seen how there are three major factors that are taken into
account in all of them: the agent that carries out the action, the act characterizing it, and
the patient who receives its consequences.
Taking all this into account, the schema depicted in Figure 1 represents a general
model for the identification of morally-qualifiable actions. It should be noted that this
model, as it is, allows to identify events that have a moral weight; however, in order to
assess the weight of those events, one needs to have an underlying set of moral values that
determine what is considered to be good, or bad, such as the previously studied games
did. As expected, different sets of moral values, or different priorities among those, will
lead to the same event as being morally-qualified in a different manner.
Figure 1. Relevant elements in the identification of a moral action.
The structure of moral actions depicted in Figure 1 captures the most relevant ele-
ments identified by the cases analyzed in Section 3, and accounts for:
• An agent, for whom we have information about its alignment. Potentially, in-
stead of a label specifying the agent’s alignment, the model could keep track of
the agent’s record of morally-qualifiable acts which, in turn, could intrinsically
represent the alignment.
• The act performed by the agent, which has a set of consequences [1 . . .n] follow-
ing from the act and given a certain probability, and which affect the patient of the
moral action. Following the insights discussed in Section 3.2, one can externally
interpret the agent’s intentions, with respect to an act, in terms of the most likely
outcomes that such act could have.
• A patient who receives the consequences of the act6, and who also has an as-
sociated moral alignment, or a record of morally-qualifiable actions intrinsically
representing the patient’s values.
In addition to the properties identified in the analyzed cases, the model has been enhanced
to capture two additional properties that can be relevant not for the identification of a
morally-qualifiable action, but rather for its assessment:
• The relationship that the patient and the agent may have, and which could be rel-
evant in terms of understanding why the agent has decided to perform the act af-
fecting the patient. Such feature could capture, for instance, the fact that assuming
that one of the patients in the trolley dilemma is a relative of the agent in charge of
deciding whether to pull the lever can influence the decision made by the agent.
• The way consequences of the act can also affect the agent, aside from the patient.
This could allow the model to take into account both a theory of right and a theory
of good (see [21]), which would allow to distinguish situations featuring an act
that could be seen as negative from the point of view of a theory of right, such as
stealing food in a market, but which could be seen as acceptable, from a theory of
good, if the agent who steals the food is a poor, starving child.
In order for this model to be implemented into an AMA, some details would still
have to be refined. For instance, determining what entities qualify as patients (human
beings, living organisms, the environment, artifacts, etc.), or whether the same conse-
quence has the same effect on each patient, would be central issues that would need to be
addressed. In addition, the AMA would need to play a double role in this identification,
as it would be both the overseer of the action, as well as potentially the source of it (i.e.:
the agent). This is, however, an endeavor we leave for future work: as we point out in the
next section, there are certain features that neither the games we took as inspiration, nor
the model we provide, can account for yet, and which would need to be addressed before
thinking about implementation details.
4.1. What is Missing?
Despite the fact that some morality systems can show a good degree of granularity, there
are still some important details that have not yet been captured in games, and which can
play a crucial role when assessing the moral weight of an event. It could be argued how if
those caveats arise from such an ideal setting, they will probably do as well when trying
to implement a way of identifying and assessing moral events in the real world, where
information is deemed to be incomplete, inaccurate, and sometimes even incorrect.
The first shortcoming is the inability to link different events: an example from Obliv-
ion can be used to show where the problem lies. In general, if one considers the in-game
action of killing a character, the game reacts as expected, with regards to the alignment
of the patient: if the player kills an evil NPC, she is rewarded, but if she kills a non-evil
6Some consequences could likely affect more than one patient; therefore, and although only one is repre-
sented in Figure 1 for the sake of simplicity, multiple patients should be taken into account.
NPC, she is punished... unless the non-evil NPC attacks first, in which case the player
is “justified” and can kill it without any kind of moral penalty. This effect leads to a
nasty strategy consisting in casting a spell that puts the NPC into an “enraged mode”
that makes it attack everyone in sight, which then gives “free way” for the player to kill
it without any kind of moral consequence. In this case, it can be clearly seen how the
game lacks the ability to identify how casting this spell towards a non-evil NPC is clearly
something that could count as a morally-qualifiable action, specially when it leads to the
player killing the NPC in the end. As such, artificial morality systems should be able to
trace a cause - effect chain between seemingly independent actions and see how the state
of affairs brought about by one had affected the conditions for the following.
From the inability to recognize the former issue, one can get a free pass on Machi-
avelian scheming to achieve one’s ends through planning morally-shady independent
events that lead to a desired outcome. As an example, it can be shown how, although
attempting to capture the players’ intentions behind their actions, Fallout 3 still fails to
recognize such cases. Still in the same quest mentioned in Section 3.2, the game allows
the player to follow certain shady ways to get, for instance, the ghouls killed without any
karma loss by not getting directly involved in it. This can be done by luring hostile NPCs
into the ghouls’ den, which results in the ghouls getting killed, but not as a result of the
player’s direct action. Considering this, it is interesting to note how, even if the notion of
karma in Fallout does indeed take intention into account up to a certain degree, it ends up
still being dependant on mostly isolated choices and actions that are directly performed
by the player, but which may not account for a more far-reaching scheming that pursue
darker ends, based on more nuanced, long-term intentions, and which involve chaining
different, seemingly independent events.
By highlighting this two interrelated caveats, it can already be seen how a proper
artificial morality system would need not only to be able to identify and assess morally-
qualifiable actions on their own, but also to keep track of possible causality chains be-
tween seemingly independent actions, as well as having a way of determining how the
state of affairs brought about by one action could have played a role in the assessment
of the moral weight of a later action. This, therefore, should be a priority for researchers
working on topics such as the design and implementation of artificial moral agents, or
the definition of formal models of moral actions.
5. Conclusions and Future Work
By looking at complex role-playing games as simulations of artificial societies, this work
identifies a set of features used by the morality systems implemented in those games to
identify and assess morally-qualifiable actions. Those insights are then abstracted from
the context of the video games and distilled into a proposed formal model highlighting
the features needed to identify moral events from an external perspective. In doing so,
this work builds bridges between the fields of artificial morality and video games under-
stood as simulations, and it tackles the question of what comes before artificial moral
agents need to act; that is, how to distinguish morally-qualifiable actions from actions
with no clear moral content, and how to assess their moral weight. In this sense, the pro-
posed model is a valuable contribution not only to the field of artificial morality, but also
potentially as a way of further refining the simulation aspect of complex video games.
When discussing the proposed model, certain shortcomings that can already be
found in video games’ morality systems are identified; those caveats concern the lack
of a joint, holistic understanding of separate events that, when put together, may reveal
an underlying goal that was not shown explicitly by any of the individual events; this
point would need to be tackled by considering chains of cause-effect by keeping track
of previous actions, and how certain consequences of an action a bring about conditions
for action b to happen. Once these caveats are solved, the model should be adapted in or-
der to allow implementation in an AMA: linking the models’ consequences and patients
into the AMA’s representation of its environment pose a challenge that would need to be
addressed as well.
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